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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of dividend Announcements on stock market reaction in 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Using an event study approach, the evidence shows that 
dividend increase announcements are greeted positively by investors, while there are 
some evidences suggesting investors react negatively prior to dividend decrease 
announcements. The observations are then separated into the magnitude of dividend 
change and income change. This paper also separates the observations into government 
linked companies (GLCs) and non-GLCs.    
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the stock market reactions to announcements of dividend increases 
and decreases in Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Prior researches in the developed 
market find that dividend changes and stock market reaction have a positive correlation. 
Dividend increase is considered as good news while dividend decreases as bad news. Two 
of the most discussed theories of dividend behavior are information signaling hypothesis 
and agency theory. The information-signaling hypothesis argues that since there is an 
information asymmetry between the management and shareholders, the only way for the 
management to signal future prospects is by changing the dividend payout. According to 
the agency problem perspective, when the management increases dividends, it reduces 
the possibility of the management misusing the firm’s free cash flow. Empirical evidence 
strongly supports this argument and thus, confirms the theory.  
The evidence in this study indicates that the stock market welcomes 
announcements of a dividend increase. The buy and hold abnormal return in 3 days 
surrounding the announcements is about 0.54 % and the return is even higher at 1.49% in 
20 days period following the announcements. The positive reaction is similar after 
controlling the magnitude of the dividend changes. When the observations are further 
split into income-increase group and income-decrease group, the positive buy and hold 
abnormal return remain significant. On the dividend decrease announcements, the 
immediate buy and hold abnormal return shows the expected sign but not statistically 
significant. There are some evidences that suggest investors react negatively prior to the 
announcements. For observations that reduced the dividend level significantly than the 
previous year level, investors react negatively prior to the announcements.  
The observations are then separated into the government-linked companies 
(GLCs) and non-GLCs. The GLCs are chosen because it is an investment arm of the 
Malaysian government and their shares are actively traded in the stock market and the 
GLCs are also the favorite stock of foreign investors.  Because GLCs have high growth 
potential and are monopolistic, studying them might give some insight into how the stock 
market reacts to dividend announcements.  
 
2. Literature review 
Dividend as the main method of distributing cash to shareholders has received 
considerable prior attention in the finance literature. Lintner (1956) suggests that firms 
prefer to smooth their dividend and reluctant to change their payout policy. The 
management is reluctant to cut dividend because it might send negative signal to investor 
and reluctant to increase payout for fear that it might not sustainable in the future. 
Following this, many empirical studies have been performed and concentrated on how the 
stock market reacts to the announcements. Almost all of the studies agree that dividend 
payout and stock market reaction move in the same direction
1
. That means stock market 
react positively on dividend increase announcement and negatively on dividend decrease 
announcement. Two of the most widely discussed hypotheses on the stock market 
behavior on dividend announcement are the information signaling hypothesis and the free 
cash flow hypothesis. 
Dividend signaling hypothesis developed by Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and 
Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) suggest that firms change their dividend 
payout to signal future performance. Since the management knows more about its firm 
than outsiders do, the only way for management to relay the information to the market is 
by changing their dividend payout pattern. Many empirical studies confirm the theory. 
For example, Aharony and Swary (1980) find that the market still reacts positively to the 
announcements even after controlling the contemporaneous earnings announcements. 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) investigated the first dividend announcement in the corporate 
history or dividend initiation after 10-year interval and find that the stock market reacts 
stronger to this type of extreme dividend announcements. Healy and Palepu (1988) find 
similar evidence on the firms that initiate and omit their dividend. The magnitude of 
negative stock market reaction is more severe on dividend omission firms. Employing 
more samples size, Michaely et al. (1995) and Robin (1998) reach to the similar 
conclusions. Docking and Koch (2005) find that stock market reaction to dividend 
announcement is sensitive to the direction or volatility of the stock market.  
Agency theory provides an alternative explanation of the market reaction to 
dividend announcements. Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) suggest that dividend act 
as discipline tool to the management. The distribution of free cash flow to shareholders 
reduces the agency conflict by making it less likely that the management will invest in an 
unprofitable business. According to this line of reasoning, the stock market reacts 
positively to announcements of a dividend increase. Alternatively, stock market reacts 
negatively to firms that reduce their dividend payout on the chance that the management 
might invest in an unprofitable business.     
Both hypotheses imply that the stock market should react in the same direction 
as dividends payment. If the market is efficient, then the subsequent operating 
performance should improve. However, the evidence on the subsequent performance is 
mixed
2
.  These contradictory results suggest that the evidence so far on the post 
operating performance of dividend paying firms is inconclusive.     
The evidence presented so far on stock market reactions and two hypotheses 
described above were developed with reference to the U.S. market. A similar line of study 
was conducted on the European market. Lonie et al. (1996), McCluskey et al. (2006) and 
Travlos et al. (2001) look into the stock market reaction in the U.K., Irish and Cyprus 
market. They find similar evidence that stock markets react in the same direction as 
dividend changes and attribute the positive relationship to the information signaling 
hypothesis. In Japan, Fukuda (2000) finds that stock markets react positively to dividend 
increase and dividend initiation announcements. However the magnitude of the reaction 
is smaller than the studies of the developed market and the post operating performance of 
the firms contradicts the predictions of the theory. In contrast, Kato et al. (2002) find that 
the free cash flow hypothesis might explain the positive stock market reaction in Japan. 
Their results show that dividend increasing firms have the characteristics of the free cash 
flow hypothesis, such as higher earnings and lower debt ratio. The evidence from the free 
cash flow hypothesis, however, is opposite to what the theory predicts. They conclude 
that the reason for this is the close relationship between shareholders and management. 
The dividend signaling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis might be 
applicable to the developed market such as in the U.S. markets or Japanese market 
because of diverse relationship between investors and management. In other words, the 
corporate governance structures in the U.S. market allow management more freedom to 
run the business. For this reason, the stock market may be the best way to signal 
management’s intentions about the future performance of their firms.  
However, other markets have a different corporate governance structure. For 
example, there is a close relationship between shareholders and management prior to the 
real estate bubble in Japan
3
 and in other markets. This close relationship mitigates the 
agency problem and there should be other explanations for the positive stock market 
reaction, which are not captured by the traditional information-signaling hypothesis and 
agency theory explanations. However, after the financial market and real estate bubbles, 
the Japanese government has introduced new regulations and amended the rules to make 
corporate governance more market-based and investor-oriented. For example, the gradual 
decline in cross-shareholding and the increase in participation by foreign investors have 
exacerbated the agency problem in recent years
4
. In the more recent study, Harada and 
Nguyen (2005) conclude that dividend-signaling hypothesis can explain well the 
situation in the Japanese market if the data used in the study is not aggregated across 
different economic situation. 
In Malaysia, there is still a very close relationship between block shareholders 
and management. In fact, the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman of the firms are 
normally the nominees of the block shareholders.  GLCs exist because of the active 
privatization program and the high growth economic policy of the Malaysian government. 
GLCs’ special characteristics allow them to control the strategic business that is 
monopolistic and that has the potential for higher investment growth.   
 
3. Data and methodology 
The initial observations in this study are all the firms that announced dividend increases 
or decreases from 2001 to 2005. All the firms were listed for at least two years. Firms that 
announce special dividend in the announcement year are excluded.  This requirement is 
to ensure that all firms in the sample had the dividend and daily stock price data. Then the 
utilities, financial, closed end funds or REITS were excluded from the sample. The stock 
price data and the dividend data are available from Datastream, Thompson Financial 
Service. A firm is defined as having increased (or decreased) its dividend in a given year 
if there was an annual dividend increase (or decrease) relative to the prior year.  
The data on the government-linked companies are obtained from the Khazanah 
Nasional Malaysia, the investment holding firm of the Malaysian government. The final 
observations consist of 853 dividend increase announcements and 376 dividend decrease 
announcements
5
.  
The announcement dates of the firms are obtained from the KLSE database. Day 
0 is defined as the day on which the firm announces its final dividend and the same 
announcement appears in the KLSE website. To control for other events, the 
announcements are not contaminated with other firm specific information such as share 
repurchase and bonus issue at least five days surroundings the announcement day.  
A standard event study method is used to analyze the stock market reactions on 
the dividend increase and dividend decrease announcements. The following market 
model is used to calculate the abnormal return: Rit = αi + βi Rmt + єi where Rit and Rmt 
are, respectively, the return to stock i and the return on Kuala Lumpur Composite Index 
on day t. αi and βi are ordinary least square (OLS) estimates. The estimation period is 
from day –140 to day –21 relative to the announcement date. The mean buy and hold 
abnormal return is employed to measure the market reactions to the dividend 
announcements in different event windows.  
 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the buy and hold abnormal return for the 40-days period surrounding 
dividend increase announcements for the observations of dividend increase firms in 
KLSE. The immediate event windows of 3-days surrounding the announcements for the 
entire sample shows the buy and hold abnormal return is positive 0.54% and statistically 
significant. On the longer event windows 20 days after the announcements, the buy and 
hold abnormal return is 1.49% and significant. The evidence indicates that investors treat 
dividend announcements as good news and react positively to the news. 
The buy and hold abnormal return on the event windows of the entire 
observations is then dividend into 4 groups according to the magnitude of the dividend 
change. The buy and hold abnormal returns on the immediate event windows of 3-day 
surrounding the announcements across the groups are all positive. However, only the buy 
and hold abnormal return in Group 2 is statistically significant. While the evidence on the 
longer event windows are all positive and significant with the highest buy and hold 
abnormal return of 1.66% in Group 3.   
 
Table 1: The buy and hold abnormal returns (%) for dividend increase firms in different 
event windows 
 
Event 
windows 
Entire 
observations 
Groups ranked by the magnitude of dividend increase 
change 
1      
(Low) 
2 3 4    
(High) 
(-20,-1) 0.10  -0.74 0.65 0.59 -0.10 
(-1,1) 0.54** 0.49 0.94* 0.37 0.35 
(1,20) 1.49*** 1.38*** 1.55*** 1.66*** 1.37** 
N 853     
      
Income-increase group     
(-20,-1) -0.22  -1.57** 0.12 1.15** -0.60 
(-1,1) 0.57* 0.73 0.66 0.56 0.33 
(1,20) 1.48*** 1.78*** 1.41** 1.50*** 1.23* 
N 471     
      
Income-decrease group     
(-20,-1) 0.50  0.53 0.62 0.14 0.73 
(-1,1) 0.49  0.42 0.90 0.35 0.31 
(1,20) 1.50*** 0.78 2.01** 1.69** 1.52*** 
N 382         
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
 
The observations are then separated into income increase-group and 
income-decrease group. For the income-increase group, the evidence is similar with the 
results of the whole dividend increase observations. The difference is that the buy and 
hold abnormal return prior to the announcements is negative and significant in Group 1. 
One may interpret the results as investors have the expectations that those firms may not 
increase the dividend substantially and overreact by selling the stock prior to the 
announcements. However, the post announcements buy and hold abnormal return in this 
group is 1.78% and it is the highest among the dividend change magnitude groups. For 
the income-decrease group, the buy and hold abnormal return is positive and significant 
in the post dividend announcements windows except in Group 1 which has the lowest 
magnitude of dividend change. The evidences on the stock market reactions across the 
various magnitude of dividend increase and between income-increase and 
income-decrease groups indicate that the stock market treat dividend increase 
announcements as good news and responded positively to the announcements.  
Comparatively, the buy and hold abnormal return earned surrounding the event 
windows is not much different when compared to the evidence found in the developed 
markets. The abnormal returns earned on the dividend increase announcement in the 
other markets are about 1.34 % in U.S. (Grullon et al. 2002), 1.42 % in U.K. (Lonie et al. 
1996) and about 0.85% in Japan (Fukuda 2000). These results indicate that the stock 
market reacts positively to announcements of dividend increases in KLSE, similar to 
other market evidence. 
Table 2 presents the buy and hold abnormal return in different event windows for 
dividend decrease observations. The result shows that the sign on the magnitude of 
dividend decrease announcements across all groups in the immediate event windows 
surrounding the announcements are negative as predicted. However, the result is not 
statistically significant. There is not enough data to reject the hypothesis that the buy and 
hold abnormal return is not equal to 0 in 3-day period surrounding the announcements. In 
Group 3 on the entire observations on dividend decrease announcements, the buy and 
hold abnormal return is positive 1.21% and significant. Further investigation to find the 
source of the positive reaction prior to the dividend decrease announcements reveal that 
positive buy and hold prior to the announcements belong to the income increase group.  
The buy and hold abnormal return for the income-increase group is 1.52%, while 
the income-decrease group is 0.33%. However, the data is not sufficient to reject the 
hypothesis that the buy and hold abnormal return in the immediate event window is not 
equal to 0. The evidence on the income-increase group also reveals that the post 
announcements buy and hold abnormal return subsequent to the announcement is positive 
0.89% and significant. One possible explanation for this scenario is that investor put more 
emphasize on the income increase than the negative aspect of dividend decrease 
announcements. There is a possibility that investors treat the income-increase group 
announce dividend decrease due to the reason that they may want to conserve cash for 
some future projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The buy and hold abnormal returns (%) for dividend decrease firms in different 
event windows 
Event 
windows 
Entire 
observations 
Groups ranked by the magnitude of dividend decrease 
change 
1      
(Low) 
2 3 4        
(High) 
(-20,-1) 0.13  0.63 0.25 1.21* -1.56** 
(-1,1) -0.34  -0.22 -0.14 -0.25 -0.74 
(1,20) 0.44  -0.34 0.57 0.86 0.69 
N 376     
      
Income-increase group     
(-20,-1) 0.29  0.58 -0.23 1.52 -0.70 
(-1,1) -0.51  0.01 -0.60 -0.31 -1.13 
(1,20) 0.89* 0.48 0.76 0.93 1.38 
N 169     
      
Income-decrease group     
(-20,-1) 0.01  0.23 0.75 0.33 -1.31 
(-1,1) -0.19  0.23 -0.22 -0.03 -0.77 
(1,20) 0.08  -1.11 0.59 0.74 0.12 
N 207     
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
For observations in Group 4 for the entire dividend decrease observations, the 
prior announcements buy and hold abnormal return is -1.56% and significant. This 
evidence suggests that investors have the ability to identify those firms that may reduce 
their dividend level significantly. This would not be surprised as listed firms in Malaysia 
are required to submit quarterly financial reports and these reports are available on KLSE 
website. The evidence suggests that investors anticipate which firms that may reduce the 
dividend level significantly and negatively react prior to the announcements. When the 
dividend decrease is announced, there is no element of surprise as the level of dividend 
reduction is anticipated earlier.   
To investigate further, the sample is separated into GLCs and non-GLCs 
subsamples. As mentioned earlier, GLCs are only involved in a strategic business and are 
inherently monopolistic. Furthermore, the GLCs are high-growth companies. The stock 
market reaction to dividend change announcements may indicate whether market treats 
the announcements differently than the non-GLCs. 
Table 3 presents the buy and hold abnormal return of the GLCs firm in the 
different event windows surrounding the dividend increase announcements and in the 
different magnitude of dividend change group.  The immediate event windows have a 
positive sign but not significant. For the entire period, the buy and hold abnormal return is 
positive 1.37%.  When the dividend increase is controlled with the magnitude of the 
dividend changes, the buy and hold abnormal return become not significant in all event 
windows and in all dividend magnitudes changes groups. For the income-increase group, 
the buy and hold abnormal return is positive and statistically significant in the post 
announcement period in Group 3. While for the income-decrease group, the prior 
announcement buy and hold abnormal return is positive and significant. The highest 
dividend increase change yield the positive buy and hold abnormal return in the post 
announcements period, as shown in Group 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The buy and hold abnormal returns (%) for dividend increase government-linked 
companies (GLCs) in different event windows 
 
Event 
windows 
Entire 
observations 
Groups ranked by the magnitude of dividend increase change for 
GLC 
1 2 3 4 
(Low)   (High) 
(-20,-1) 0.43  -0.10 -1.40 1.10 2.10 
(-1,1) 0.96  1.29 0.48 0.82 1.25 
(1,20) 1.37** 2.01 -0.48 2.20 1.74 
N 100     
      
Income-increase group     
(-20,-1) -0.97  -2.15 -2.64 -0.15 1.05 
(-1,1) 1.05  1.65 0.93 1.21 0.42 
(1,20) 1.31  2.43 -0.73 3.86* -0.31 
N 56     
      
Income-decrease group     
(-20,-1) 2.21*  2.24 0.55 2.98 3.07 
(-1,1) 0.84  1.00 -0.21 -0.15 2.72 
(1,20) 1.43  0.70 0.72 0.10 4.21* 
N 44     
**Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
Table 4 shows the buy and hold abnormal return for the dividend decrease GLCs. 
For the entire observations, the buy and hold abnormal return prior to the announcements 
and in the highest magnitude of dividend decrease is -5.62% and significant. The 
evidence suggests that the stock market seem to anticipate the severity of dividend 
decrease level prior to the announcements for the GLCs. The evidence in the two largest 
dividend decrease magnitude that belongs to the income-decrease group further support 
this results. This evidence shows some support that the market treats severe dividend 
decrease announcements negatively. They negatively react ahead before the dividend 
decrease news is released. However, the post announcement buy and hold abnormal 
return in the income-increase group is 3.62% and significant. This evidence may suggest 
that investors do not punish the firms that decrease their dividend due to the reason that 
these firms may want to conserve cash for future projects.  
 Table 4: The buy and hold abnormal returns (%) for dividend decrease 
government-linked companies (GLCs) in different event windows 
 
Event 
windows 
Entire 
observations 
Groups ranked by the magnitude of dividend decrease change for 
GLC 
1 2 3 4 
(Low)   (High) 
(-20,-1) -0.91  2.57 3.61 -3.74 -5.62** 
(-1,1) -0.13  -0.16 -0.44 0.11 -0.03 
(1,20) 1.45  2.16 0.87 -0.29 2.91 
N 41     
      Income increase group     
(-20,-1) 0.66  1.93 2.12 0.64 -2.06 
(-1,1) -0.01  -0.87 -0.67 -0.14 1.65 
(1,20) 3.62**  4.99 3.46 1.78 4.24 
N 20     
      Income decrease group     
(-20,-1) -2.41  3.21 5.11 -8.12** -8.58** 
(-1,1) -0.24  0.55 -0.21 0.35 -1.43 
(1,20) -0.61  -0.66 -1.72 -2.35 1.81 
N 21     
**Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 5 shows that for the non-GLCs, the buy and hold abnormal return is 
positive and significant in the immediate announcements windows and in the longer 
period subsequent to the announcements. In the magnitude of dividend changes groups, 
the buy and hold abnormal returns are significant in all the 20-day post announcement 
period. The evidence here supports the notion that stock market treat dividend increase 
announcements as good news and positively reacts the announcements. Group 1 of the 
income-increase group which has the lowest magnitude of dividend increase, the buy and 
hold abnormal return is negative and significant prior to the announcements. The 
evidence suggests that investors may not favor the lower magnitude of dividend increase 
initially. However, the buy and hold abnormal return continue to increase in the post 
announcement period. The overall conclusion from this dividend increase non-GLCs 
group is that the post announcement return is positive and significant in most of the 
groups.   
Table 5: The buy and hold abnormal returns (%) for dividend increase non-GLCs in 
different event windows 
 
Event 
windows 
Entire 
observations 
Groups ranked by the magnitude of dividend increase change for 
non-GLC 
1 2 3 4 
(Low)   (High) 
(-20,-1) 0.06  -0.83 1.11 0.33 -0.38 
(-1,1) 0.48* 0.44 0.93 0.34 0.20 
(1,20) 1.51*** 1.27*** 1.84*** 1.64*** 1.27** 
N 753     
      Income increase group     
(-20,-1) -0.12  -1.57** 0.60 1.27* -0.80 
(-1,1) 0.51  0.54 0.75 0.51 0.23 
(1,20) 1.50*** 1.68** 1.79** 1.11 1.44* 
N 415     
      Income decrease group     
(-20,-1) 0.28  0.02 0.93 -0.18 0.37 
(-1,1) 0.45  0.30 1.08 0.27 0.13 
(1,20) 1.51*** 0.77 2.20*** 1.77** 1.30 
N 338     
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
Table 6: The buy and hold abnormal returns (%) for dividend decrease non-GLCs in 
different event windows 
 
Event 
windows 
Entire 
observations 
Groups ranked by the magnitude of dividend decrease 
change for non-GLC 
1 2 3 4 
(Low)   (High) 
(-20,-1) 0.26  0.48 -0.06 1.54* -0.95 
(-1,1) -0.36  -0.24 -0.11 -0.29 -0.82 
(1,20) 0.32  -0.63 0.64 0.83 0.45 
N 335     
      Income increase group     
(-20,-1) 0.24  0.40 -0.60 1.69 -0.52 
(-1,1) -0.58  0.13 -0.65 -0.34 -1.43 
(1,20) 0.52  -0.13 0.34 0.67 1.19 
N 149     
      Income decrease group     
(-20,-1) 0.28  -0.31 0.56 1.66 -0.74 
(-1,1) -0.19  0.18 -0.26 -0.11 -0.55 
(1,20) 0.16  -1.42 1.34 0.86 -0.13 
N 186     
*Significant at 10% level  
 
Table 6 shows that for the entire observations, the buy and hold abnormal return 
is positive and significant prior to the dividend decrease announcements in Group 3. The 
evidence suggests that investors seem to ignore the potential dividend decrease 
announcements initially, when the announcement is made, they react negatively. 
However, the buy and hold abnormal return in the immediate event windows is not 
significant, although it has the expected sign. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The results in this paper indicate that, consistent with studies in the other markets, the 
dividend increase announcement is greeted positively by the stock market. The evidence 
suggests that the positive reaction is across different magnitude of the dividend increase 
change and across income change groups. There is also evidence that investors do not 
favor the small magnitude of dividend increase. However, the post announcement return 
shows that investors treat dividend increase announcements as good news and positively 
react to the announcements.  
For the dividend decrease announcements, the immediate buy and hold 
abnormal returns have the negative sign but not statistically significant. The data is not 
sufficient to support the hypothesis that the buy and hold abnormal return for the dividend 
decrease is not equal to 0. However, there are some evidences that indicate that investors 
react negatively prior to the announcements, as indicated by the evidence of the highest 
magnitude of dividend decrease change in the entire observation of dividend decrease 
group and in the GLCs group.   
One possible reason for lack of response to dividend decrease announcements in 
the immediate event windows is that investors in Malaysia anticipate earlier on firms that 
may decrease their dividend significantly. The share price is negative prior to the 
announcements and this evidence indicates that investors react negatively before the 
dividend decreased is announced.  
 
Notes: 
 
1
 Pettit (1972) is among the earlier paper that finds stock market treats dividend increase 
announcements positively and negatively on dividend decrease announcement. 
 
2
 For example, Grullon et al. (2005), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Benartzi et al. (1997), 
and DeAngelo et al.(1996) find the subsequent operating performance negatively related 
to the announcements, while Zhou and Ruland (2006), Arnott and Asness (2003), Nissim 
and Ziv (2001), Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Healy and Palepu (1988) conclude the 
signals are credible. 
 
3
 See Dewenter and Warther (1998), Lonie et al. (1996), McCluskey et al. (2006) and 
Travlos et al. (2001) that explain the relationship between shareholders-investors in their 
respective markets. 
 
4
 See Seki (2005), Yoshikawa and Phan (2005), Jackson and Moerke (2005) and 
Bebenroth and Tabuchi (2004). 
 
5
 These figures are obtained after the data are truncated at 5%. 
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